

Warning of the Russian Invasion of Crimea

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Early morning Friday February 28, 2014 unidentified armed men in military uniforms without insignia took control of the airports, television, internet and telecommunication on Crimea. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine went from cold to hot, from diplomacy and clandestine intelligence operations to an invasion and later open warfare. On March 18, after failed attempts on peace talks and negotiation, the conflict shifted from a political to a military stage when a Ukrainian soldier was killed and another wounded during a confrontation with Russian military forces and pro-Russian militias, as they stormed a Ukrainian military base in Simferopol, Crimea. On April 15 Ukrainian military and pro-Russian forces clash when Ukrainian 'Anti-Terrorist operations' began in Donetsk, Ukraine. The conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths on both sides, massive destruction of infrastructure and property, a refugee crisis and collateral damage when Malaysia Airlines flight 17, on July 17, 2014, was accidentally mistaken for a Ukrainian military airplane and shot down, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew on board. The conflict has lasted for more than five years and there is no solution in sight. The question that begs an answer is; how could this happen? Because Russia obviously succeeded in their endeavours the question of whether this incidence can be called an intelligence failure may be asked. If a failure – what kind and what are the root cause of the failure? An equally important question is what lessons can we learn from this case? It is argued that the Russian invasion of Crimea was an intelligence failure on the Ukrainian and the Western part because policymakers did not act on strategic and tactical warnings appropriately and in time. The intelligence failure was a combination of inadequate threat warning and threat response in part rooted in outside enemies of intelligence. This resulted in that Russia, using both own resources and separatists in Ukraine, was able to conduct their operations and achieve their immediate objective without meaningful opposition and interference by

Ukraine, the European Union (EU) or the United States of America (U.S.). As this case reveal, an intelligence failure is not necessarily a failure in connecting the dots or separating the noise from the actionable information, but a failure of the government to adequately collect and interpret information and act upon it. The root of this failure can to a large part be attributed to a successful operation of denial and deception employed by Russia leading up to the invasion of Crimea and the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which kept Western policymakers from reacting until too late. The paradox of warning in addition to the question of whether Russia, in this case, was a rational actor complicated the task of providing actionable intelligence. The main lessons from this case is therefore that warning is not certain and that deception work.

In order to understand the problem at hand one need first to address what constitute an intelligence failure and who might be to blame. This is important because there are different perceptions on the issue. Gill are among those who argue that intelligence failure is made by an intelligence agency.¹ That means that the failure can be caused by a failure to collect enough, or the correct, information and data. Or, it can be caused by the analyst who misinterpret the information and data available. Gill argue that an intelligence failure occurs “when intelligence gets it wrong so that misleading information is presented to executives resulting, possibly but not inevitably, in unsuccessful policy.”² There are, according to Gill, essentially two types of failure.³ This first is a false negative; which is a failure to understand something that is a threat, and which leads to a surprise. The second is a false positive; which is when something that is perceived as a threat turns out not to be. To many of the latter quickly becomes a ‘cry wolf’ problem where policymakers stop paying attention to intelligence agencies and their reports. The former is, by this definition of intelligence failure and this particular case, the lack of adequate warning of the Russian invasion of Crimea and later the violence in Eastern Ukraine. Gentry

¹ Gill, P. (2007). Sorting the Wood from the Trees. Were 9/11 and Iraq «intelligence Failures»? Strategic intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government. L. K. Johnson. London;Westport, Conn,, Praeger Security International. 1: 151-168.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

on the other hand include the policymakers in his definition of intelligence failure. He argues that "intelligence fails if a state does not adequately collect and interpret intelligence information, make sound policy based on the intelligence (and other factors), and effectively act."⁴ In addition to failure made by intelligence agencies in collecting and interpreting information, how policymakers perceive and act upon intelligence is now naturally included. This distinction matters because failure to act appropriately is equally important when trying to avoid intelligence failures and adverse consequences in matters of security or other political interests. However, there is not always an agreement or coordination on definitions. An example of this is the different comments to media after the Russian invasion of Crimea. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz) said during a session on Capitol Hill in Washington D.C. it was a 'massive failure' that the U.S. intelligence agencies did not predict Russia's activities before the invasion of Crimea.⁵ It can be argued that Sen. McCain used Gills definition of intelligence failure as a basis of his statement and accusation. On the other hand, the intelligence community fronted by the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper quickly responded and disputed that characterisation. Clapper said, "we tracked [the situation in Ukraine] pretty carefully and portrayed what the possibilities were and certainly portrayed the difficulties we'd have, because of the movement of Russian troops and provided anticipatory warning of their incursion into Crimea".⁶ The CIA also says it kept policymakers informed about its own predictions. Todd Ebitz, a CIA spokesman, told NBC that the predictions included possible scenarios for a Russian military intervention in Ukraine.⁷ This suggest that policymakers were warned about a number of different scenarios, and where one of those scenarios described a Russian invasion of Crimea. But as described earlier, warning is one part of the problem, action is another. Because things evolved quickly in this crisis decision-making processes may have taken too

⁴ Gentry, J. A. (2008). "Intelligence Failure Reframed." *Political Science Quarterly* **123**(2): 247-270.

⁵ Green, J. J. (2014, March 10). "DNI Clapper: Ukraine Intelligence 'Not a Failure by Any Stretch'." Retrieved 21 April, 2019, from <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-interviews/speeches-interviews-2014/item/1027-dni-clapper-ukraine-intelligence-not-a-failure-by-any-stretch>.

⁶ Herb, J. (2014, October 3). "Clapper: Ukraine was not an intelligence failure." Retrieved 21 April, 2019, from <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/200322-clapper-ukraine-was-not-an-intelligence-failure>.

⁷ Brown, H. (2014, March 6). "Why It's Wrong To Claim U.S. Intel 'Failed' To Predict Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine." Retrieved 21 April, 2019, from <https://thinkprogress.org/why-its-wrong-to-claim-u-s-intel-failed-to-predict-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-c1878ba0a056/>.

long if available options were not planned for in advance. Is it possible to plan for all contingencies? Maybe not, however, because of the strategic importance of the Black Sea Fleet and other interests, Russia probably already had contingency plans for annexing Crimea at an opportune moment.⁸ These plans were probably made many years ago and regularly updated. The question can be made whether the West made similar plans to prevent or dissuade Russia from making such a move or to prevent them from succeeding if they did. It can be argued that such preparations should have been made after the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest where promises of future membership were given to Ukraine and Georgia. Or were there no real interests in the West to risk military or other types of confrontation with Russia? These are difficult questions to answer and perhaps irrelevant to this essay other than to point to the responsibility of policymakers to order such plans to be made in advance. A failure to do so is a failure to give oneself options if a crisis would occur. Different definitions of intelligence may exist and be used by different parties for different reasons. This essay, however, argue that the best way to understand the lack of action by policymakers in the West to possible Russian aggression in Ukraine, is to use Gentry's definition of intelligence failure. The reason for this is that the primary target for the use of denial and deception was ultimately the Western policymakers how might employ different measures to block or deter Russia from annexing Crimea and start a violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. That said, Cozad write, "all too often, warning is treated as a binary issue and categorized as either a success or a failure. Many studies of warning assign blame to either the intelligence community (IC) for missing key events and decisions or to policymakers for not acting upon an IC warning. The warning events [...] demonstrate that these clear-cut distinctions are often difficult, if not impossible, to make, and disagreement among an event's key participants often remain unresolved."⁹ As we will see later in the essay, this intelligence failure was a failure of government – both the intelligence community and the policymakers. To succeed the whole system within government must work. The reason why Gentry's definition is more correct in our

⁸ Bebler, A. (2015). "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." Romanian Journal of European Affairs 15(1): 35-54.

⁹ Cozad, M. R. (2018). Strategic Warning on NATO's Eastern Flank: Pitfalls, Prospects, and Limits. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.

case is that Russia aimed to deceive both in order to delay action and make it possible for Russia to succeed with their immediate objectives.

Russia has an interest in Ukraine and used denial and deception techniques leading up to and during the conflict because it improved their chances of success in reaching their objectives. They executed their plans skilfully and managed to make the Western IC guessing about their intention, and thus made it difficult for Western policymakers to react in time and with appropriate countermeasures. This case is a good example of what Betts describe as the outside enemy of intelligence. Betts call the governments or groups of people which are in conflict with the United States, and who want to conceal or misrepresent their vulnerabilities, capabilities and not least intentions the outside enemies of intelligence. The term outside enemies is thus used on a nation's main foreign adversaries, actual or potential.¹⁰ Denial and deception is often used by outside enemies to conceal and misrepresent relevant information. Deception can be defined as "those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests."¹¹ Deception is most likely to succeed if "designed to fit in with and magnify its target's own preconceptions."¹² Denial on the other hand refers to "the attempt to block information which could be used by an opponent to learn some truth."¹³ The reason Russia wants to conceal or distort information is to get a political, strategic and tactical advantage in a conflict or a competition. Russian objectives are closely tied to their interests. Examples of this is security and economic interests. Russia has since the fall of the Soviet Union had an interest in what it has described as Russia's 'near abroad'. This is a term that has historically referred to the former Soviet states, including Ukraine.¹⁴ "Vladimir Putin, like his predecessor wanted not just good relations but as much integration

¹⁰ Betts, R. K. (2007). Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security. New York, Columbia University Press.

¹¹ Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence power in peace and war. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Godson, R. and J. J. Wirtz (2000). "Strategic Denial and Deception." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence **13**(4): 424-437.

¹⁴ Helmus, T. C., E. Bodine-Baron, A. Radin, M. Magnuson, J. Mendelsohn, W. Marcellino, A. Bega and Z. Winkelman (2018). Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.

with Ukraine as possible.”¹⁵ However, since the break-up of the Soviet Union political tensions between Ukraine and Russia have continued on many issues such as “the status of Crimea, the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between the two states, the basing rights of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, the Russian use of military facilities on Crimea, and the number and status of the Russian military personnel on Ukrainian territory, etc.”¹⁶ Controlling Ukraine, or parts of it, is therefore vital for Russia’s perception of security.¹⁷ Bebler write that President Putin, in his keynote speech at a joint session of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament on March 18, 2014, clearly stated what was the geopolitical rationale for the annexation of Crimea. “NATO’s presence in close proximity to Russia’s Southern borders, ‘directly in front of the Russian house’, ‘on Russia’s historic territories’ remains to President Putin and to the Russian elite utterly unacceptable. The sheer possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO has been viewed by Putin as an acute threat to the security of Southern Russia. In order to not be ‘lost in the near future’, Crimea needed to be under ‘a strong and steady sovereignty...’ which ‘could be only Russian’.”¹⁸ When there was a real possibility that Russia would ‘lose’ Ukraine to the West a plan was set in motion.¹⁹ In order to reach its objective surprise was needed to prevent interference from Ukraine and the West. Russia’s decision to use denial and deception was a key element in reaching their objective and can be linked to both statistical reasons and their long history of practice. As described by Bennett, “deception is the central tool of secrecy, protection, and evasion; it is the enabler of surprise.”²⁰ Deception has proven to be highly effective. Professor Barton S. Whaley has shown that “out of 50 battles in which intense surprise was achieved, 17 far exceeded the objectives of the initiators, and only one

¹⁵ Donaldson, R. H. and V. Nadkarni (2019). The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests. New York, Routledge.

¹⁶ Bebler, A. (2015). "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." Romanian Journal of European Affairs **15**(1): 35-54.

¹⁷ Dragneva-Lewers, R. and K. Wolczuk (2015). Ukraine between the EU and Russia: the integration challenge. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire;New York, NY;, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁸ Bebler, A. (2015). "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." Romanian Journal of European Affairs **15**(1): 35-54.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Bennett, M. and E. Waltz (2007). Counterdeception principles and applications for national security. Norwood, MA, Artech House.

ended in defeat.”²¹ Russia and the former Soviet Union also has a long history of successful denial and deception operations. They even have a name for it – maskirovka – which translates as ‘something masked’.²² As described by Godson, a successful denial and deception campaign requires several components. “First, the campaign benefits from strategic coherence. The deceiver nation must have an overall plan in mind for the achievement of its objectives; it must determine in advance how the target should behave and how deception will contribute to that outcome. The deceiver also must predict how the target will react in the wake of both successful and unsuccessful deception.”²³ Given the result, it can be argued that Russia managed all of these components well. Cozad write that “many of Russia’s current denial and deception capabilities consists of such traditional maskirovka (deception) activities as camouflage, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, and psychological operations.”²⁴ He further write that “recent denial and deception efforts have included the use of unmarked military equipment, cyber operations, passportization, clandestine infiltration of military personnel, and media manipulation.”²⁵ However, while Russia employed most if not all of these techniques in the conflict with Ukraine, not all had to work perfectly. Cozad write that the “deception is not necessarily meant to mask all preparatory or early activities. Rather, its primary purpose is to provide initial, insurmountable advantage by creating doubt sufficient to slow down an adversary’s reaction time. The activities do not need to be flawless or sophisticated. They need only to be good enough to create confusion.”²⁶ Denial and lies is another vital part of maskirovka. As used by President Putin at a press conference a few days after the invasion when he described the masked men in green uniforms without insignia as local self-defence

²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, E. G. Davis and C. M. Grabo. (2011, August 4). "Deception." Retrieved May 5, 2019, from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol16no4/html/v17i1a05p_0001.htm.

²² Ash, L. (2015, 29 January). "How Russia outfoxes its enemies." Retrieved 22 April, 2019, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283>.

²³ Godson, R. and J. J. Wirtz (2000). "Strategic Denial and Deception." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence **13**(4): 424-437.

²⁴ Cozad, M. R. (2018). Strategic Warning on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Pitfalls, Prospects, and Limits. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

units, and not Russian soldiers.²⁷ He later admitted that the soldiers were Russian, but the lie had served its purpose. This did not stop the Russians to use another lie when fighting started in Eastern Ukraine. This time the little green men where only “patriotic volunteers who have gone to the region on holiday.”²⁸ The web of lies used are designed to make people guessing and create uncertainty. The volume of content generated from multiple sources for propaganda and misinformation campaign is enormous and “seeks to manipulate and distort the international response to behaviors that under normal circumstances would result in clear and unambiguous policy cohesion among allied Western nations.”²⁹ It is evident that Russia’s ability to implement effective denial and deception measures played a role in limiting Western decisionmakers’ understanding of the Russian leadership’s intent in the conflict. “Significant information and corresponding indicators were available, but Russian intentions were unclear or misread.”³⁰ As earlier described, the IC in the West was aware that Russia was up to something. The challenge in this case was understanding Russian leaders’ intentions and identifying when those leaders finally decided to act. The Russian use of denial and deception reduced the diagnostic value of indicators necessary for warning. The reason why this case can be described as an intelligence failure is that Russia managed to hide and distort the Western perception of intent long enough during the critical phases to succeeded in their objectives without resistance from Ukraine and the West. In this case Western policymakers clearly delayed making decisions until they felt they had a sufficient level of certainty, which turned out to be too late. This case demonstrate that effective warning is not merely the assessment provided by the IC. As Cozad write “effective warning also generally cannot alleviate shortfalls in force posture and realistic policy options. If forces and planning are not in place and aligned to respond effectively, warning becomes an informational exercise.”³¹ There were of course a

²⁷ Ash, L. (2015, 29 January). "How Russia outfoxes its enemies." Retrieved 22 April, 2019, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Fitzgerald, C. W. and A. F. Brantly (2017). "Subverting Reality: The Role of Propaganda in 21st Century Intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* **30**(2): 215-240.

³⁰ Cozad, M. R. (2018). *Strategic Warning on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Pitfalls, Prospects, and Limits*. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.

³¹ Ibid.

number of things that could go wrong in the Russian plan to annexing Crimea and destabilize Ukraine. One example of this is the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight 17. However, it can be argued that Russia had experience, a clear goal, and a detailed plan which they managed to execute. They even had many advantages such as troops already in place on bases in Crimea, proximity though a common border, in addition to a Russian speaking population in Ukraine. In many ways it was easier than normal to conceal their preparations. Even though Russia had interests that was widely known and a history of dispute with Ukraine in areas of security and economy they still managed to conceal intention and timing of their operation. The outside enemy of intelligence therefore played a vital part in why this case can be described as an intelligence failure.

In order to prevent surprise, policymakers want the IC to give them perfect and actionable information. Wirtz describe actionable intelligence as “information of immediate and direct use to policymakers.”³² When waiting for this perfect information they often stall in their decision-making proces until it is too late. While those that gets surprised may take some preventative actions, these actions are rarely enough. The reason might be that, while there might be tactical warnings, if this warning contradicts strategic level estimates of the adversary’s behavior it will rarely be enough to change perceived opinion held by decisionmakers. This is what Dahl calls the paradox of strategic warning. He argues that “strategic level intelligence and warnings are surprisingly easy to acquire and are often readily available before major attacks. But they are unlikely to be acted upon by decision makers, and in any case are too general to be useful in preventing attacks. Tactical-level intelligence is much harder to acquire, but when available it is much more likely to be useful and actionable. This is largely because surprise attacks, even when they have strategic-level consequences, are essentially tactical events, involving relatively few decision makers and occurring in a relatively confined space and time.”³³ Dahl further argue that “if intelligence authorities are able to develop

³² Wirtz, J. J. (2009). The American approach to intelligence studies. Handbook of Intelligence Studies. L. K. Johnson. New York, Routledge: 28-38.

³³ Dahl, E. J. (2013). Intelligence and surprise attack: failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press.

specific, tactical-level intelligence, and if policymakers believe the threat and trust the intelligence, the surprise attacks are more likely to be disrupted. But if these two conditions do not exist, then it is highly unlikely that a well-planned major surprise attack will be disrupted.”³⁴ Dahl also clearly support Gentry’s definition of intelligence failure when he writes that “for intelligence to succeed, it is not enough that the intelligence community saw a threat coming and warned about it. [...] intelligence counts for little if decision makers are not receptive to the warning they receive.”³⁵ However, while Dahl’s theory may explain many relevant issues relevant to warning there are some weaknesses. One example of this is that it seems that the theory presumes a leadership failure because decision makers are passively waiting for more information. Another example is that it seems to presume a collection failure due to lack of enough tactical-level information. Yet, even if tactical-level information is available, this information may be of little use if the adversary seems to be irrational or unpredictable. The problem of rationality also highlights the dangers of mirror-imaging where one is led to believe that others thinks and acts like yourself. Heuer writes that “failure to understand that others perceive their national interests differently from the way we perceive those interests is a constant source of problem in intelligence analysis.”³⁶ The reason behind some of the seemingly irrational behavior can be explained by Allison’s bureaucratic politics model and Putnam’s theory of the two-level game. Putnam’s two-level game model is a metaphor for domestic-international interactions where “at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressure, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.”³⁷ A head of state such as President Putin sits at both game boards, and it can be argued that according to Putnam’s theory he would strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Heuer, R. J. J. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence.

³⁷ Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." International Organization **42**(3): 427-460.

and that domestic interest probably comes first. ³⁸ Putnam further writes, “the political complexities for the players in this two-level game are staggering. Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.”³⁹ As Khrushchev tried to handle a domestic problem, he inadvertently created the Cuban missile crisis. While trying to manage pressure from internal hardliners he created an international nuclear crisis. It can also be asked who President Putin was most concerned with in this case; internal hardliners or the international community? Putin received high approval rates in Russia after the annexation of Crimea, while being condemned internationally. It might be that this was a price President Putin was willing to pay in order to stay in power. Allison, on the other hand, in his bureaucratic politics model argue that decisions are made through “bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood [...] as outcomes of bargaining games. [...] The bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players, who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well, in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.”⁴⁰ Allison further write that policy will be resolved by politics and that “what the nation does is sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over others. More often, however, different groups pulling in different directions yield a resultant distinct from what anyone intended. What moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course of action, nor the routines of organization which enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.”⁴¹ This power play within the Russian government may portray the invasion of Crimea irrational to the West and could lead to a different

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Allison, G. T. (1969). "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." The American Political Science Review 63(3): 689-718.

⁴¹ Ibid.

outcome than expected. 'Irrational behavior' may therefore be what Robert Gates describes as mysteries. While secrets are things that are potentially knowable, mysteries are problems where there are no clear-cut answers. This might be the case when the other leader themselves do not know what they are going to do yet or have not worked out their problems in order to make a decision.⁴² While failure may happen due to innocent and inherent enemies of intelligence the outside enemy will always be a major challenge because it deliberately tries to use denial and deception to help achieve their goals. Jervis write that "intelligence is a game between hinders and finders, and the former usually have the easier job. Intentions, furthermore, often exist only in a few heads and are subject to rapid change. Deception is fairly easy, and the knowledge that it is possible degrades the value of accurate information".⁴³ Warning is therefore not a fact, "a tangible substance, a certainty, or a refutable hypothesis. [...] Warning is an intangible, an abstraction, a theory, a deduction, a perception, a belief. It is the product of reasoning or of logic, a hypothesis whose validity can be neither confirmed nor refuted until it is too late."⁴⁴ It is thus important not to expect certainty in warning.⁴⁵ It will always be an assessment of probabilities.⁴⁶ It is therefore appropriate to end with Grabo's statement that "there is no single facet of the warning problem so unpredictable, and yet so potentially damaging in its effect as deception. Nor is confidence in our ability to penetrate the sophisticated deception efforts in any way restored by a diligent study of examples."⁴⁷ Sometimes a surprise might occur simply because your adversary has an advantage and plays the game better.

This essay has shown that the surprise of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was an intelligence failure by Ukraine and Western government due to inadequate threat warning and adequate response in time. This was in large part a result of skillfully employed Russian denial and deception operations. However, the essay has also

⁴² Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence power in peace and war. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁴³ Jervis, R. (2010). Why intelligence fails: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press.

⁴⁴ Grabo, C. M. (2002). Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

revealed some of the difficulties in warning intelligence due to the many paradoxes in warning and the vulnerability of mirror-imagining. The main lesson from this case is therefore that warning is not certain and that denial and deception operations work.

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